Resetting the TCC: the army must fight, the community must supply

Serhii Pietkov  Ukrainian legal scholar, Doctor of Legal Sciences, professor

A new social contract for the Ukrainian home front.

The start of the big war: queues at the TCK, weapons handed out from trucks and the first tragedies of volunteers

February and March 2022 will forever remain in Ukraine's history as a period of unprecedented chaos, superhuman courage and a total mobilisation of spirit. The system of military enlistment offices (the TCK and SP) then came under a pressure that no paper instruction could have prepared it for.

In the first days of the full-scale invasion, huge queues formed at the TCK. Men and women stood for hours not to obtain a deferral but to demand weapons and take part in defending the state. The system could not keep up with registering thousands of volunteers through the usual procedures. The arming of the Territorial Defence Forces (TrO) in some places happened literally “on the fly” – assault rifles were handed out from trucks against a passport, because there was simply no time for bureaucracy.

At the same time, a dense network of makeshift and official checkpoints covered the country. Volunteers, civilians only yesterday, patrolled the streets around the clock, detected DRG and built barricades. It was precisely this living shield of regular servicemen, National Guard members and motivated TrO volunteers that managed to do the impossible – to stop and rout the elite Russian units near Kyiv, saving the capital from occupation.

But this spontaneous resistance and the lack of proper coordination on the ground came at a terrible, bloody price. The enemy acted treacherously and cruelly, shooting those who tried to resist without proper cover. In Bucha, the shooting of local volunteer lads at one of the first checkpoints. They had only light small arms and an unbreakable will, but found themselves face to face with the occupiers' armour. The Lilac Park in Kherson is one of the most painful symbols of the start of the war. Local territorial defence fighters, armed with practically nothing but “Molotov cocktails” and assault rifles, went out to meet Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The occupiers simply shot them with large-calibre weapons. The missile strike on the “Kanatove” airfield is a tragedy in the Kirovohrad region, where enemy fire killed volunteers who had arrived to carry out tasks and form units.

This period demonstrated the main thing – the colossal potential of Ukrainian society and its readiness for self-sacrifice. At the same time it exposed the critical need to reform the system of registration, mobilization and reserve management. Spontaneity saved the country in the first weeks, but a long war of attrition required a clear, digitalized and professional system of the TCK and SP.

Half-measures of digitalisation and the need for an effective administrative and legal mechanism

In the first years of the full-scale war, the TCK and SP system made a notable step forward in technology. The introduction and launch of the unified electronic register of persons liable for military service “Oberih”, as well as the mobile app “Rezerv+”, partly relieved the offices of paper routine and gave millions of citizens a convenient tool for updating their data. However, digitalization has still not been brought to its logical and systemic conclusion.

The main flaw of the current model is the preservation of outdated punitive-administrative approaches inside new digital shells. A striking example is the “wanted” status (the so-called “red line”) in the Rezerv+ app. In practice this status often appears because of minor technical errors, the untimely entry of data by a TCK operator, or simply the absence of an up-to-date marker in the database, even if the person has updated their data.

Instead of a clear legal procedure, this status turns a person liable for military service into a “fugitive” in the eyes of the first patrol on the street. This breeds corruption risks and conflicts and demoralizes society, even though it is an ordinary administrative offence that should be resolved in the legal sphere.

The system of dealing with violators of military registration rules must be shifted onto the track of transparent administrative enforcement – by analogy with European practices and with the system operating in Ukraine for the automatic, camera-based recording of traffic violations or the collection of alimony.

An effective model should look like this. If a person breaks the registration rules (for example, fails to appear when summoned or does not update specific data), they receive an official notice in their electronic account or through the state notification system: “An administrative-offence report/ruling has been drawn up against you; you are obliged to pay a fine.”

Introducing a differentiated system. If an offender admits guilt and pays the fine promptly (for example, within 10–15 days), they pay only 50% of the amount. If the deadline is missed, the fine is charged in full at 100%, with a penalty accruing for each day of delay.

For each subsequent disregard of the law's requirements, the amount of the fine should rise proportionally, creating financial pressure on the offender.

If fines are not paid, the state should not have to chase the citizen through the streets. The case is handed to the Enforcement Service, which applies a package of tough civil-law restrictions — similar to those for malicious defaulters on child support. Blocking of bank accounts and automatic write-off of debts. Temporary restriction of the right to drive vehicles. Putting the debtor's car on the police wanted list with subsequent towing to the impound lot during a roadside check.

Shifting the TCK to such a model would ease social tension, remove the corruption factor of “street detention” and make violators feel the inevitability of punishment through their own pocket and comfort. The state must fight lawbreakers with the methods of law and digital algorithms, not with force at public transport stops.

Systematic sabotage of reforms: corruption, “busification” and the SZCh (AWOL) crisis

Alongside the imperfection of digital procedures, a far deeper, systemic crisis unfolded. The TCK and SP, together with the military medical commissions (VLK), in effect demonstrated an unwillingness to reform from within, preserving the worst practices of the Soviet system of coercion, multiplied by the corruption opportunities of wartime.

The media and news feeds explode every day with reports of the detention of yet more TCK officials or heads of the VLK. The cynicism of the situation is measured in colossal sums: millions of dollars found under mattresses, the purchase of luxury real estate abroad and of luxury cars during the hardest phase of a war of attrition. Corruption has become not merely an offence but a direct threat to national security, because it has allowed well-off citizens to “buy their way out”, shifting the entire burden of the war onto the shoulders of those who have no such money.

The inability (or unwillingness) to set up civilised record-keeping led to the emergence of so-called “seizure groups”. The streets of Ukrainian cities filled with patrol cars and minibuses without identifying markings. Mobilisation measures turned into special operations. The patrolling of residential areas and the effective stalking of citizens near their entranceways. Joint checkpoints of the TCK and the police at key junctions, highways and crossing points in towns, paralysing traffic and business. Mass “round-ups” at markets, in shopping centres and on sports grounds.

The term “busyfikatsiia” has become a firm popular meme that unfortunately reflects reality — the forcible seizure of citizens, often in violation of every conceivable procedural norm, and their being pushed into the “busiki” (minivans).

But the most terrible manifestation of this crisis was the documented cases of beatings, torture and the unlawful detention of citizens directly on the premises of the TCK and SP. Some cases ended tragically, destroying the remnants of society's trust in the institutions of the TCK.

The consequences of such a coercive approach are catastrophic for the army. Citizens who have been brought in by force, demotivated and at times openly Russified or anti-Ukrainian in outlook go through basic general military training (BZVP) only “on paper” or “under duress”. Once directly in combat units, such soldiers become not a reinforcement but a critical burden for commanders. They lack the inner core needed to fight. At the first opportunity they resort en masse to SZCh (unauthorised abandonment of a unit). They demoralise the regular units and the motivated volunteers.

The quantity obtained through street violence completely negates the quality of defence. The TCK in its current form has begun to work towards the collapse of mobilisation rather than its provision, discrediting the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the eyes of its own people and international partners.

Crisis at the front and the collapse of social justice

The violence and legal nihilism that arise at the stage of a street detention do not disappear after the mobilised person is sent to the army. The worst thing is that systemic problems have grown inside the army structure itself, finally undermining people's motivation. The information space and the mass media increasingly flash headlines about outrageous cases in guard units, assault brigades and individual formations (in particular, the loud scandals around individual units such as “Skelia” and others).

Today's serving soldiers, who bear the entire burden of the war, are suffering from a whole set of crises. Reports of abuse by individual incompetent or “petty-tyrant” commanders, of hazing, and of treating the mobilised as a disposable resource have ceased to be isolated rumours and are becoming public. The absence of clear terms of service, transparent rotation rules and demobilisation wears people down psychologically; they realise this is a “one-way ticket”, which leads to burnout and despair. When transfers, awards or leave depend not on merit but on loyalty to the command, the army's inner resilience begins to crumble.

As a result, recruits and even some of the mobilised begin to feel a panic fear of the front line – not from fear of the enemy as such, but from fear of ending up under the command of people who do not value their lives and are unable to ensure elementary military order and tactical logic.

This crisis within the army meets a reinforced-concrete wall of social injustice in the rear. Every citizen – both in the trench and on the street – today faces one and the same question: “Why do deputies, officials, prosecutors and their children not serve?”

Society sees a striking contrast. An ordinary person is “bundled” into a van near a factory or a market and within a few weeks sent into the assault infantry. Meanwhile the children of top officials, members of parliament and judges post photos from elite resorts abroad or obtain a “deferment” and fictitious disabilities through corrupt MSEK and VLK commissions. The officials, prosecutors and security officers themselves find legal loopholes en masse to remain untouchable in the rear, shielded by special registration or deferment.

Mobilisation in Ukraine has ceased to be a nationwide duty to defend the Motherland and has turned into a “tax on poverty and the lack of connections”. Without an immediate resolution of the question of fairness — when everyone serves, regardless of position, wealth or surname — and without the harsh eradication of violence both in the TCKs and inside military units, no digital registers or higher fines will save the mobilisation process from total collapse.

Prerequisites for reform: three main factors of the systemic deadlock

Is there a way out of this seemingly deadlocked situation? Undoubtedly, yes. Any crisis of state governance has its own legal and organisational toolkit for resolution. But before setting out a step-by-step mechanism for escaping the impasse in which the Ukrainian army and government find themselves, we must look soberly and frankly at the three fundamental problems that created this impasse. Without understanding them, any reforms will remain mere “cosmetic repairs”.

Despite the harsh street methods of mobilisation described above, the real manning of combat brigades remains critical. “Busification” produces figures only on paper. In practice, the army faces a shortage of people directly in the trenches. Because of the low quality of selection, the poor health of recruits, mass refusals and going AWOL (SZCh), combat units are forced to fight amid a constant shortage of personnel. This leads to an excessive burden on those who remain in the ranks and to the loss of territory through the simple inability to hold positions.

And perhaps the most painful wound of the current system: the volunteers and conscripts of the first wave, who deliberately came to the TCC and the territorial defence (TrO) in February and March 2022, are still at the front. People have been fighting for a fifth year now with no clear prospect of demobilisation or even a proper, long rest. The absence of service terms set by law (for example, 36 or 48 months) has turned the fulfilment of a constitutional duty into open-ended penal servitude. This not only burns out the best, but also demotivates the rear: civilians see that getting into the army is a one-way ticket with no right of return.

In parallel, a dangerous trend has unfolded in the information space — the systematic devaluation of the image of the defender. On social networks, in the media and at times even in everyday conversations, a destructive narrative is beginning to dominate. Service members are increasingly portrayed through the prism of negative stereotypes: that they all supposedly have severe PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), are unpredictable and suffer from alcoholism or drug addiction.

This stigmatisation performs a doubly destructive function. It justifies civilians' fear of mobilisation (“I don't want to become like them”). And it creates a psychological barrier between veterans and society, deepening the rift and destroying the very unity on which the country held out at the start of the large-scale invasion. This list shows that the TCK crisis has long gone beyond the enlistment offices alone – it is a nationwide crisis of human capital in a protracted war.

Cognitive warfare: how Ukrainian mistakes became the Kremlin's main victory

In analysing this impasse, we must clearly realise that the problems described have long gone beyond purely internal miscalculations of our authorities or army command. All these processes unfold against the backdrop of a brutal cognitive war. Information attacks, manipulation and the artificial fanning of internal conflicts at the mental level are a strategic priority of the enemy. The Russian Federation acts on the classic, centuries-tested principle of imperialism — “divide and rule” (divide et impera).

Through bot networks, anonymous Telegram channels and agent-run media resources, the Russian special services systematically strike at the most vulnerable points of Ukrainian society, setting different groups of citizens against one another. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) against residents of host regions. Those who went abroad against those who stayed under shelling. Businesses and civilians trying to preserve the economy against state institutions.

The enemy registers any internal tension in Ukraine, takes a real fact (for example, corruption in the VLK or yet another case of “busification”) and inflates it to the scale of a catastrophe, convincing citizens that their state is an enemy from which they must hide.

Yet the most dangerous and, sadly, the greatest achievement of Russian information operations to date is the attempt to set the army against society.

For the Kremlin this is a strategic triumph. In 2022 the unity of the people and the army was absolute: the army was flesh of the flesh of society, its pride and its protection. Today the enemy is destroying that bond step by step. Through the circulation of videos of brutal detentions, through the spread of stereotypes about “mentally unstable veterans” and through emphasising the hopelessness of service, Russia is turning the image of the Ukrainian soldier in the eyes of part of the civilian population from “defender and hero” into a “threat”.

As a result, the opposite effect arises: service members at the front, exhausted by years of service, begin to feel the aloofness and indifference of the home front, while civilians in the rear begin to perceive the TCK and army institutions as a punitive apparatus.

Reforming the TCK and restoring justice is not merely a question of citizens' comfort; it is a question of the state's survival. Every day the old corrupt system of coercion is preserved works directly in favour of the Russian strategy of division.

The path to solving the problem: from piecemeal patching to systemic rethinking

What is the way out of the situation that has arisen? The answer is obvious: targeted actions, cosmetic personnel reshuffles, yet another replacement of the heads of individual TCKs, or loud but isolated arrests of bribe-takers are, of course, necessary, but they will not help. They only create a temporary illusion of fighting the symptoms, leaving the disease itself untouched.

The country needs exclusively a comprehensive, systemic solution to the problem at the state level. The mobilisation and functioning of the Defence Forces cannot exist in isolation from legal, economic and social reality.

Above all, Ukrainian society as a whole – and every individual citizen in particular – must clearly understand and rethink the role and place of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Defence Forces in protecting the state. The army is not a separate, isolated caste fighting somewhere out there, nor a punitive body that “hunts” people in the rear. The Defence Forces are the nation's main instrument of survival, the shield that holds up the very possibility of Ukraine's existence. Yet this instrument cannot work effectively if the overall system and the mechanism of citizens' interaction with the state are broken.

Interaction between the citizen, the state and the army must be built on a systematic basis. Every citizen must see their clear path within the overall structure of defence — from civilian professional to military specialist, taking into account their skills, education and actual state of health. The army must become an effective corporation of protection, where a person is a valuable resource and not a statistical unit for a report.

If the state demands that a citizen fulfil their constitutional duty, it must in return guarantee rock-solid legal standards: quality training, adequate provision, competent command and clear terms of service.

The role of the Defence Forces of Ukraine in protecting the state is nationwide. This means that the mechanism for manning the army must be equal for all. Society will believe again in the importance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine only when it sees that the system of interaction between the state and the citizen works regardless of the thickness of one's wallet or of posts in the corridors of power.

What is needed is not just to swap paper for computers at the TCK, but to change the philosophy of the relationship between a Ukrainian and their state during the war.

Communication without fear and cleansing the system: experience as the new standard

The foundation of a comprehensive reset must be a radical change in the defence ministry's information policy. The state and the military leadership must not be afraid to speak openly and honestly with their own society. Attempts to hush up internal ills while hiding behind the phrase “now is not the time” only play into the hands of hostile psychological operations (IPSO) and deepen the chasm of distrust.

In this context, an extremely positive and telling example is the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief speaks openly about problems — from systemic failures in mobilisation to glaring incidents on the ground — sets an entirely new standard of state communication. It breaks the old Soviet tradition of “not airing one's dirty laundry in public”.

Moreover, this openness is reinforced by tough administrative and legal measures: direct orders to hand over material on offences to the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR). Such an approach shows society that the army's top command does not intend to shield its “own” and is no less interested in cleansing the structure than ordinary citizens.

To restore trust in the institution of mobilisation and in the army as a whole, this course must become total. The cleansing of the system must rest on two ironclad rules: the corrupt behind bars, their property to the front. Any official of the TCK or the military medical commission (VLK) who enriches himself on bribes for deferrals or “write-offs” must become a defendant in criminal cases of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR), with immediate suspension, confiscation of property and a public trial. Justice must be visible.

Persons who break the law, use violence against civilians during mobilisation or – worse still – abuse their subordinates in military units must not merely be removed from their posts. They must bear strict criminal liability. A commander or military commissar who has come to feel like a “feudal lord” must automatically become a defendant.

The healthy core of the army itself strives for change and wages a struggle against the rear-echelon and internal parasites of the system. Cleansing through the DBR and honest dialogue is the only way to prove to civilians that the army is fighting for the rule of law and is itself ready to live by the law.

The division of functions during a total war: the army fights, the state and the people provide

All the previous problems – from the street violence of the TCK to the shortage of equipment in units – are a consequence of breaking the main, fundamental rule by which a state at war operates. This rule must be carved in stone at the level of national strategy: the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the army as a whole must solely fight and prepare for war!

Soldiers should not have to think about where to get printer paper in the rear, how to beg drones from volunteers or how to organise complex supply logistics on their own. Everything, without exception, must be rock-solidly provided by the state and the people.

We must recall and finally make work at full strength the fundamental principle of our Independence. The protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and ensuring its economic and information security are the most important functions of the state, the cause of the entire Ukrainian people.

Thus, mobilisation in the face of an existential threat cannot be the affair of the recruitment offices or a single ministry alone. It must be total and all-encompassing. But totality does not mean that every person must be thrown into a trench with a rifle. Totality is the full, systematic mobilisation of all the country's resources, in which every institution, every official and every factory work towards a single goal.

State authorities, ministries, agencies and local self-government bodies (from regional centres to the smallest communities, OTH) are obliged, in wartime, to stop playing at “peacetime life” and laying paving stones. Their only function today is to supply the army and every combat unit with everything they need, 100 percent.

This system of interaction must be based on the following. The state must provide clear, effective Laws and Standards. No vague wording. What is needed are transparent mechanisms of reservation (deferment), fair rotation rules, clear supply norms and strict liability for failing to meet them.

A combat unit must receive all regulated supplies automatically, not through a system of “wrangling” or volunteer fundraising. Heavy equipment and weapons — on time and with servicing. Quality kit — to the highest protection standards for every soldier. Technological superiority — the uninterrupted, mass supply of reconnaissance and strike drones, UAVs, electronic warfare and communications equipment directly from state plants and under state contracts.

The army gives the state the most precious thing – the lives and health of its soldiers. The state, in turn, is obliged to give the army all its resources, technologies and managerial capacity. Only such parity and respect for the law can lead us out of the deadlock and ensure real, not paper, readiness for a long struggle.

Decentralisation of mobilisation: the community as the centre of provision, coordination and control

For this large-scale system to work, society must change its role from passive observer or victim to that of an active customer. Citizens must firmly demand that the state do everything for the army, rather than wait for rear-area officials to organise themselves. And the most effective instrument of such a demand is returning the mobilisation process to the level of local communities.

Every military unit (brigade, battalion) must be clearly tied to a specific territorial community and to the business entities (SPD) at its place of formation. This creates a direct, living link. The community and local business know exactly whom they have sent to the front – they are their neighbours, relatives, fellow countrymen. The community takes patronage over “its” unit, supplying it directly with additional technology, drones and everyday necessities, bypassing the bureaucratic labyrinths of the central agencies.

The current system of the TCK and SP in uniform has discredited itself through force and corruption. The way out lies in a fundamental overhaul of the institution. The functions of mobilisation and record-keeping must be fully transferred to the military-civil administrations (VCA) and to local self-government bodies.

Civil administrations have ready-made infrastructure, TsNAP centres, demographic registers and direct access to the population. When mobilisation is run by the civil authority of the community, the process loses the features of an “army hunt” and becomes a transparent administrative procedure. Citizens become active participants in mobilisation rather than its targets.

The main advantage of decentralisation is that at the level of a village or a neighbourhood the residents know everyone. Public oversight on the ground works better than any punitive squads. The community knows perfectly well who really has the right to a deferment and who is openly dodging the duty with the help of bribes. Local residents know where those who have committed unauthorised absence from a unit (SZCh) are hiding. It is precisely the authority and pressure of the community, which does not want someone else's father or son to go to the front instead of a deserter, that can bring people back within the legal framework. The community can and must identify and bring in offenders on its own, defending its own sense of justice.

But this control must be two-way. A community that sends its people to the army gains the lawful right to strictly monitor the organization of Basic General Military Training (BZVP). Relatives and community representatives must have access to monitoring conditions at the training centres: how recruits are trained, what they are fed, whether the soldiers are provided with everything they need. If the “training unit” abuses people or trains them only on paper, the community is the first to raise the alarm and, through the military-civil administrations, blocks such processes.

Transferring mobilisation to the control of communities and Military-Civil Administrations is the only way to wrest the system from the hands of corrupt military commissars. When the army fights, the civil authority organises the process, and the community provides and oversees fairness, Ukraine will obtain that total, conscious and all-encompassing defence capable of stopping any enemy.

Total mobilization of the system: security officers into assault units and the assignment of regions to corps

To restore absolute social justice and solve the problem of the understaffing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the state must take a step it has so far not dared to take. The country's mobilisation reserve is hiding not in the markets or on the buses; it sits in offices, courts and law enforcement bodies. The notion of “untouchable castes” must, in a total war, be eliminated as a phenomenon.

All civil servants, law enforcement officers and representatives of the security bloc, without exception, must share the fate of their people. The procedure must be clear and without alternatives. Absolutely all officials of state authorities, officers of the National Police, the BEB, the NABU, the customs service, as well as the personnel of security structures of any form of ownership and subordination, must be entered one hundred per cent into the unified register. The same applies to all serving judges, staff of court offices and retired judges. Particular attention is due to former staff and young, able-bodied pensioners of the MVS, the SBU, the DSNS and other agencies who receive state pensions but have combat or professional skills. To begin with, they are all obliged to undergo genuine Basic General Military Training (BZVP).

Once their training is complete, these categories of citizens must be called up to rank-and-file positions directly in the combat assault units. People who for years represented state power, carried weapons or dispensed justice in the rear must personally prove their loyalty to the state on the front line of defence. This would instantly remove the issue of social tension and give the front hundreds of thousands of physically prepared, disciplined and educated soldiers.

In parallel with this, the interaction between the front and the rear must be given a clear geographical and financial anchoring that will ensure the army's stability. All enterprises and business entities of a region are assigned by law to specific combat brigades. The direct link is held by a triangle: the unit commander (brigade commander) — the head of the military-civil administration — the heads of the enterprises. The brigade receives direct funding and material aid from the business of its own region, bypassing corrupt superstructures.

To each oblast (or group of regions) a specific army corps is assigned. The oblast becomes the rear base of that corps. Military-civil administrations and local communities are fully responsible for the manning, training, treatment, rehabilitation and ensuring regular rotations of that corps' fighters. The community knows exactly: “we have to replace our countrymen at the positions in X months, so we are preparing a new shift.”

Those returning from the front after serving the set terms or for health reasons must not end up on the margins of life. Assigned enterprises and local authorities guarantee them immediate employment, adaptation and the preservation of a decent level of income. A soldier should know that the community awaits them not with flowers, but with a job ready and waiting.

The authorities must not simply punish draft dodgers, but mobilise the security services, officials and judges, while at the same time creating a new, logical “community–authorities–brigade” structure. This completely changes the architecture of the country's defence, making it fair, transparent and viable.

The inevitability of sanctions and a return to the roots: the philosophy of the Cossack state

The last but fundamental element of the proposed reform is the introduction of a total and strict system of accountability. The system will work only when sanctions and punishments affect not just the ordinary deserter, but everyone who, through their actions, inaction or corrupt interest, undermines the country's defence capability.

The digitalisation of the process must become ever more precise, transparent and uncompromising. Instead of a chaotic hunt on the streets, the state must apply clear legal and economic levers. In particular, persons who ignore lawful demands and evade registration automatically end up in open electronic registers of offenders. This entails a full restriction of civil rights: the blocking of accounts, a ban on any transactions with property, and the revocation of driving licences and the right to public services.

Strict legal liability (both financial and criminal) must extend to relatives, landlords or employers who knowingly provide shelter or work to persons who are wanted. At the same time, if the authorised bodies of the military-civil administrations or the police show inaction in identifying offenders in their territory, the heads of these bodies must be immediately removed from office for professional unsuitability.

The harshest punishment must fall on officials who take money to “turn a blind eye”, issue fictitious certificates or simply promise to “sort out the matter” and leave the violator outside the system's attention. In wartime this is outright treason.

Also, if the command of a training ground or the instructors treat the training of fighters negligently, sending untrained people to the front, they must themselves immediately be stripped of their ranks and transferred to assault units as privates. A soldier's blood is on the hands of the one who failed to train him.

But the main conclusion is that victory in this existential war can be won only by reviving the Ukrainian Cossack code. For all the digital registers, laws and administrative algorithms are merely technical instruments. On their own they will not win the war. The main thing we have to change is the philosophy of how we perceive the state and duty.

Ukraine will win only when we remember who we are by our nature. We need a Cossack state and Cossack approaches. The Cossack republic was always built on rock-solid principles that we are obliged to restore today. The Cossack (the fighter) is the highest value and a respected person, while a corrupt rear-echelon man or a coward is an outcast with no right to a voice. Before the enemy all were equal — from the hetman and the colonel to the rank-and-file Cossack. No golden boys, no nepotism, no buying one's way out. Treason, cowardice or theft from one's brothers-in-arms was punished mercilessly and instantly.

The combination of modern, precise digital transparency with the uncompromising Cossack spirit of justice, tempered over centuries, is the only algorithm that will lead the Ukrainian army and government out of the impasse. Only when the defence of the Motherland again becomes an honourable Cossack right for everyone, and not a coerced burden for the poor, will Ukraine win its longed-for and just Victory.

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